Efficiency and persistence in models of adaptation by D'Hulst, R & Rodgers, GJ
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
10
51
89
 v
1 
  9
 M
ay
 2
00
1
Efficiency and persistence in models of adaptation
R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers
Rene.DHulst@brunel.ac.uk and G.J.Rodgers@brunel.ac.uk
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Brunel University
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK
(October 27, 2006)
A cut-and-paste model which mimics a trial-and-error process of adaptation is introduced and
solved. The model, which can be thought of as a diffusion process with memory, is characterized
by two properties, efficiency and persistence. We establish a link between these properties and
determine two transitions for each property, a percolation transition and a depinning transition. If
the adaptation process is iterated, the antipersistent state becomes an attractor of the dynamics.
Extensions to higher dimensions are briefly discussed.
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For some time, physicists have been working on prob-
lems outside the scope of traditional physics, as illus-
trated by recent papers on the cooperation between ac-
tors [1], the repetition of ancestors in genealogical trees
[2] or the scaling of football goal distributions [3]. In
many of these systems, whether they are in economics,
the social sciences or biology, the process of adaptation,
or how an agent or organism adapts to a particular event,
plays a very important role. Unfortunately there is no
general theory of adaptation which reflects either the
ubiquity or the simplicity of the process. In this Let-
ter, we introduce and solve toy models for adaptation,
in order to identify some basic properties of the process.
We investigate the dynamics of a trial-and-error adapta-
tion process, which can be represented as diffusion with
memory. First, a random guess is made, then, the system
reacts to this initial guess. After this two-step process,
it is interesting to consider if the adaptation process has
improved the original random guess or not. To answer
this question, a measure of efficiency of the adaptation is
necessary, and we will show that this property, efficiency,
is closely related to another property of the adaptation
process, persistence.
Although we will not explicitly model microscopic el-
ements, it is helpful to suppose that there exists some
microscopic adaptive entities, generically called agents.
These agents are trying to guess what the best action
would be and the result of their aggregate decisions is
a macroscopic parameter, x. After this initial step, the
agents detect a global result which is the difference be-
tween x and 1/2. The individual reactions of the different
agents to this information produces a diffusion of size p
from the larger population to the smaller one. The ideal
reaction would result in x = 1/2. However, they lack a
leader who can synchronize their individual choices and
achieve perfect coordination. If there is cooperation, it
has to emerge spontaneously from the system. In this pa-
per, we do not concern ourselves with the precise details
of the implementation of the agents’ decision process, nor
on how they adapt. The only questions we investigate
are the influence on efficiency of the size of the adaptive
population, and how efficiency is related to persistence.
Consequently, the model is defined as follows. In the
first step, a quantity of length 1 is cut into two pieces of
length x and 1 − x with probability f0(x), as shown in
Fig. 1 (a). In the second step, a fraction p of the larger
piece is cut and pasted to the smaller piece, as shown
in Fig. 1 (b) and (c), respectively. This transforms the
random guess distribution f0(x) into an ‘educated guess’
distribution f1(x). In the model, we imagine that we
are macroscopic witnesses of some microscopic adapta-
tion process, which is not modeled explicitly. The object
of the model is to investigate the appearence of coopera-
tion between microscopic entities in the absence of global
control. Here, cooperation is synonymous with obtaining
two pieces of equal length. After the two step process,
a record of the improvement in cooperation is made by
updating a quantity A. A→ A+1 when x is closer to 1/2
after than before adaptation and A → A − 1 otherwise,
with A ≥ 0. We assume that the model is played several
times, without any correlations between the different re-
alizations, apart from the fact that we always start with
the same distribution f0(x). A is a biased measure of the
rate of increase in cooperation after adapting. Adapta-
tion is driven by the prospect of improving on an initial
situation, which keeps A non-negative.
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FIG. 1. Schematic view of the cut-and-paste model, where
we take x > 1/2, without loss of generality.
For simplicity, we consider that f0(x) = f0(1 − x),
1
implying that f1(x) = f1(1 − x), where f1(x) is the size
distribution after adaptation. This distribution is given
by
f1(x) =
∫ 1/2
0
dy f0(y)δ(y + p(1− y)− x)
+
∫ 1
1/2
dy f0(y)δ(y(1− p)− x) (1)
with a mean value m1 = 1/2. The magnitude of the de-
viations from m1 determine the efficiency of the system.
There are several quantities capable of measuring these
deviations and they all give qualitatively similar results.
We choose to use the variance σ21 of f1(x), equal to
σ21 = (1 − p)
2σ20 +
p(3p− 2)
4
+ 2p(1− p)K0 (2)
where σ20 is the variance of f0(x), and we define
K0 ≡
∫ 1/2
0
xf0(x) dx. (3)
For this measure of the efficiency, the optimal value of
the adaptation is given by the minimum of σ21 ,
pc =
4σ20 − 4K0 + 1
4σ20 − 8K0 + 3
. (4)
The boundary between doing better and doing worse
when adapting is determined by σ21(p
∗) = σ20 , and this
gives p∗ = 2pc, independent of f0(x).
However, as we mentioned earlier, we assume that
there are no correlations between successive realizations
of the model. Hence, σ21 represents a statistical measure
of efficiency over several realizations of the model, but
this is a quantity that is not available to anyone seeing
the game played once. In other words, if we imagine an
agent taking part in the cut-and-paste model, his mea-
sure of efficiency is based on one realization of the model.
The probability Γ(p) of improving on an initial guess is
equal to
Γ(p) = 2
∫ (1−p)/(2−p)
0
f0(x) dx, (5)
which is a monotonically decreasing function of p, equal
to 1 when p = 0 and 0 when p = 1. Like σ21 , Γ(p)
is not a property directly available after one realisation
of the model, but it gives a probability about the out-
come of one such realization. If we remember that, after
adapting, we want to make a judgement upon whether
adaptation was worth it or not, Γ(poa) = 0 corresponds
to the onset of adaptation. That is, for p < poa = 1,
it becomes possible that adaptation leads to an improve-
ment, which is similar to a percolation transition [7]. The
order parameter of the transition is Γ(p) which scales
as Γ ∼ (poa − p)
β for p less than, but close to, poa.
The value of the critical exponent β depends on the
analytical form of f0(x). For Γ(pan) = 1/2, the sys-
tem undergoes another transition, from non-adaptive to
adaptive. For p > pan, A stays close to 0, while for
p < pan, A is ‘depinned’ from 0 and goes away at a veloc-
ity van = 1−2Γ(p). This velocity, equal to 0 for p > pan,
is the order parameter of the transition [8]. For p < pan,
the symmetry between adapting or not is broken.
The two previous quantities, σ21 and Γ(p), are both re-
lated to the efficiency. Another important property of
the model is its persistence, which measures the propen-
sity of one piece being the smaller piece both before and
after adaptation. The probability that the smaller piece
remains the smaller piece after adaptation, the persis-
tence probability Π(p), is equal to
Π(p) = 2
∫ (1−2p)/2(1−p)
0
f0(x) dx (6)
if p < 1/2 and zero otherwise. In fact, persistence and
efficiency are closely related quantities, as can be seen in
Fig. 2. For any position x at a distance d from 1/2, the
symmetric position with respect to 1/2 is at distance 2d
from x. In other words, if d marks the boundary between
antipersistent and persistent, then 2d is at the boundary
between better and worst than the previous step. This re-
lation is expressed mathematically by the fact that simi-
lar properties for efficiency and persistence are character-
ized by Γ(peff ) = Π(ppers), which implies peff = 2ppers.
For instance, the onset of persistence and adaptation
are characterized by Π(pop) = Γ(poa) = 0. From the
previous relation, one obtains the relations poa = 2pop,
where pop signals the onset of persistence, Π(pop) = 0
and pan = 2pap, where pap signals the antipersistent-
persistent transition, Π(pap) = 1/2. Hence, a character-
istic property of persistence in the system requires twice
as much reaction from the system to have the same effect
on the system efficiency. Note that the antipersistent-
persistent transition corresponds to a symmetry breaking
between left and right for p < pap.
x
0 11/2
d
2d
FIG. 2. Relation between the value for the best adapta-
tion (d) and the value to obtain the symmetric situation with
respect to 1/2 (2d). This relation is at the origin of the con-
nection between persistence and efficiency.
We illustrate the previous results in Fig. 3 with a
uniform distribution f0(x). With this choice, pap = 1/3,
pc = 5/14, pop = 1/2, pan = 2/3, p
∗ = 5/7 and poa =
1. We have chosen to show the different functions as
functions of 1/p to allow a visual comparison with the
Minority Game, as we explain later.
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FIG. 3. Variance σ21 of f1 as a function of p (left scale),
persistence probability Π and improvement probability Γ as
functions of p (both on the right scale). The initial distribu-
tion f0(x) is uniform on (0, 1). The dots (•) mark the special
values of p considered in the text. The dashed horizontal line
shows the variance of f0(x).
Assuming very strict bounded rationality [5], we have
considered up to now that the system was adapting once
only. However it is straightforward to apply the cut-
and-paste model recursively. After an initial cut with
distribution f0(x), a fraction p of the larger piece is cut
and pasted on the side of the smaller piece, creating a new
distribution f1(x). Then, a fraction p of the larger piece is
cut and pasted on to the side of the smaller piece, creating
f2(x), and so on. The main conclusion is that the system
can be persistent for a transient period, depending on
the initial conditions, but that it will eventually enter an
antipersistent phase where the left piece is alternatively
the larger and then the smaller piece. For a given value
of p, the system has entered the antipersistent attractor
for all initial conditions after
iatt =
ln 12
ln(1− p)
− 1 (7)
adaptations. We find that
lim
i→∞
fi(x) =
δ
(
x− 12−p
)
+ δ
(
x− 1−p2−p
)
2
, (8)
and the system becomes fully efficient only for quasistatic
adaptation, with the larger and the smaller pieces ulti-
mately becoming equal if p→ 0.
Finally let us mention that the cut-and-paste model
can easily be extended to higher dimensions, using vec-
tors ~x and ~p as the random guess and adaptation re-
spectively, and another point ~a as the implicit aim. We
present a two-dimensional example in Fig. 4. As seen in
the figure, depending on ~p, the adaptation is either bet-
ter or worse than random, the best possible adaptation
being along line 1, a better than random adaptation can
also be achieved along line 2, while along line 3, the adap-
tation process is always inefficient. The circle marks all
points that are equivalent to ~x. If ~x is the initial guess,
falling inside the circle after adaptation corresponds to
improving on the initial guess.
1
2
3
Better than before
Worse than before
x
a
FIG. 4. Adaptation on a two-dimensional plane. If the
adaptation is along 1 or 2, the model is similar to a
one-dimensional model, while for adaptation along 3, there
is no better-than-random phase.
In summary, we have presented a cut-and-paste model
to mimic a trial-and-error process of adaptation, and
showed that the model displays two properties, persis-
tence and efficiency. A pair of transitions is associated to
each property. A pair is composed of a percolation tran-
sition, corresponding to the onset of the property, and a
depinning transition, corresponding to the growth of the
corresponding property. One particular point to under-
line is the close relationship between efficiency and per-
sistence. A characteristic property of persistence in the
system requires twice as much reaction from the system
to have the same effect on the system efficiency. If the
model is iterated, the system always reaches an antiper-
sistent state, where the left piece is alternately smaller
and then larger. Our model is inspired by the Minority
Game, a model to mimic the exchange of a commodity
between agents which, despite its more complex features,
displays transitions similar to the ones presented here
[9,10]. We will provide a detailed comparison with the
Minority Game elsewhere [11], but here we presented Fig.
3 as a function of 1/p instead of p to allow a visual com-
parison with the variance of the number of buyers in the
Minority Game [10]. Numerous properties found here are
reminiscent of the Minority Game. For instance, while
much of the analytical research has concentrated on the
system efficiency, it is the antipersistent-persistent tran-
sition which is best understood, thanks to an analogy
with spin glasses [12]. Another point to note is that the
critical parameter of the Minority Game, a parameter
called α, has two important values, αc where the vari-
ance is a minimum and α∗ where the variance is equal
to a random guess. These are related by α∗ ≈ αc/2. In
fact, we argue that the original Minority Game is itself
an intricate formulation of this simple mechanism, where
the size of the adapting population is a complex quan-
tity depending on the history given to the agents and
the strategy space. The simplicity of the cut-and-paste
3
model suggests that many of the more complex features
of the Minority Game may be more common and univer-
sal than originally believed.
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